An exploration of American attitudes towards the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provides important opportunities to contribute towards an unusual combination of research domains-public opinion and public administration. In this paper, we employ a survey commissioned by the IRS and conducted in 1987 to determine what it is about the IRS specifically and bureaucracies in general that makes them both such unpopular entities in contemporary American public opinion.
The word "bureaucracy" is usually considered so negative that virtually every recent major scholarly consideration of the performance of bureau-419 SPEAKING IN TWO VOICES cracy begins with an acknowledgment of the poisonous connotation of the word (e.g., Downs 1967; Goodsell 1985; Niskanen 1971) . Of course, with "anger at Washington bureaucrats" a popular account for electoral change in both the 1992 and 1994 elections and with levels of trust in government at record lows (Stanley and Niemi 1995, 157) , it seems clear that the American public is increasingly dissatisfied with nonelected federal officials. This is at the same time that United States bureaucrats deliver services with an efficiency unmatched by equivalent public servants in virtually every other government (Goodsell 1985,59-60) and when the actual number of civilian federal employees is now at a 12 year low (Stanley and Niemi 1995, 250) .
Why is it that "bureaucracy" has become so odious a word at a time when the federal bureaucracy provides such high delivery of service with fewer personnel? Scholars of public administration speculate that Americans hold bureaucracies in such disfavor because they have such high and competing expectations about their performance (see especially Wilson 1967 Wilson , 1989 ; but also see Goodsell 1985; Perrow 1986 ). Citizens expect bureaucracies to be equitable and fair, to provide all citizens with the same treatment under the law; citizens also want bureaucracies to be flexible, to acknowledge the variations in conditions that might make for differential application of the law. Responsiveness competes with not just equity, but also with efficiency. Bureaucracies could maximize their efficiency by treating all inputs similarly, but only at the expense of the recognition of individual variation. Bureaucrats-especially those that handle taxpayer money-should be honest, but Americans do not object when bureaucrats cut us some slack on our own (presumably minor) violations. Wilson wrote in 1967: Obviously the more a bureaucracy is responsive to its clients-whether those clients are organized by radicals into Mothers for Adequate Welfare or represented by Congressmen anxious to please constituentsthe less it can be accountable to presidential directives. Similarly, the more equity, the less responsiveness. And a preoccupation with fiscal integrity can make the kind of program budgeting required by enthusiasts of efficiency difficult, if not impossible (1967, 5) .
If scholars of public administration are correct, competition between expectations of equity, responsiveness, and honesty abound in the attitudes of Americans towards the federal bureaucracy. One agenda of this paper is to examine the roles of these expectations of the performance of other actors as predispositions which in turn structure attitudes about the federal bureaucracy.
Another agenda of this paper is to grapple with the wealth of scholarship (e.g., Kinder and Sanders 1996; Rokeach 1973; Sniderman and Piazza 1993) documenting the importance of values, beliefs, and other predispositions in structuring mass attitudes. Values may reflect such key principles as egalitarianism, freedom, capitalism, and racial equity, and emerge in considerations about topics as diverse as racial politics, welfare, foreign policy, and social policies. Furthermore, others have addressed what happens when multiple predispositions (usually values) apply to a policy domain Brehm 1995, 1997; Katz and Hass 1988; McGraw and Glathar 1994; Tetlock 1986; Zaller and Feldman 1992) . Although nearly all of this literature treats competition among multiple values as a source of intra-individual value conflict, or ambivalence, it is far from obvious that the presence of multiple values necessitates internalized conflict.
It is possible that the multiplicity of values is irrelevant to the structure of political attitudes. This may arise when respondents are able to reconcile potentially competing demands with relative ease. It may be that one of the values is more highly prized than the other: if a respondent favors liberty over equality ("Goldwater" in Rokeach's study), equality over liberty (Rokeach's "Lenin") , wants neither ("Hitler"), or sees them as not in conflict (the "Socialist"), then the relevance of multiple values does not lead to more variable choice. A similar effect would emerge if the apparent strength of one value may be lip-service to satisfy social pressures. A respondent who expresses strong support for racial equality, but only because he or she feels under social obligations to do so, may have little difficulty reconciling his or her attitudes along lines of racial resentment.
Another possibility arises when the multiplicity of values are mutually reinforcing. Such a scenario emerges when two attributes of a policy choice are complementary, in fact or merely seen as such: respondents may value a policy both for its low cost and for its accomplishments. Citizens who found the supply-side economic reasoning of the early 1980s plausible may have believed general tax cuts were good because they reduced burdens upon citizens (a value of limited government), and because they believed that such cuts would lead to greater revenues by stimulating growth (a value of support for capitalism and growth). Obviously, other citizens were skeptical of the capacity of tax cuts to accomplish both purposes: it is entirely possible that citizens can be wrong in their understanding of the effect of policies along multiple dimensions.
What we offer in our research is a method by which we can establish inferentially whether the presence of multiple values for individual respondents leads towards internalized conflict, is irrelevant for their policy choices, or is mutually reinforcing. These are three states which we refer to as ambivalence, uncertainty, and equivocation, respectively. Among the objectives of the present paper is to delineate the criteria by which we can inferentially separate the three internalized states. Although it is beyond the scope of the SPEAKZNG IN TWO VOICES   421 present project, we turn to speculation about what policy debates are most likely to lead to each of the three internalized states in our conclusion.
Our paper follows in four main sections. We first differentiate theoretically between ambivalence, uncertainty, and equivocation. Secondly, we discuss our general model of attitudes, and how we operationalize it into an econometric model. We then describe our data for the present paper and the construction of our principal measures. Thereafter we present our results for models of attitudes towards the IRS. The final section elaborates on our conclusions, with respect to the literature on public opinion and public administration.
Ambivalence, Uncertainty, and Equivocation
While it is conceivable that specific values (statements about desirable end-states, or the means to accomplish them) may pertain to evaluations of bureaucracy, in this paper we argue that another form of predispositions, which we call expectations, are appropriate. By "expectations" we mean beliefs about probable results from engaging with a specific political actor (here, the IRS). Americans may "value" honesty, fairness, and responsiveness-indeed, this is a perfectly reasonable interpretation of these largely positive goals for bureaucracy. But it is more accurate to think of these as expectations about what bureaucracies will or will not accomplish.
It is far from evident, however, that there really is competition between expectations about bureaucratic performance. People may believe in equity, honesty, and efficiency, but only as they apply to other individuals. When it comes to their own treatment by bureaucracy, Americans want responsiveness and see no problem when they also expect efficiency. People have remarkable abilities to contextualize every potential policy problem and that such abilities should come to bear in attitudes towards those who deliver policy would hardly be surprising. Citizens want bureaucracies to meet these goals, but do not see the problematic implications which are so obvious to public administration scholars. Further, if these expectations are really competing, then there is no particular reason to expect systematic bias in the mean response (i.e., depressing attitudes toward bureaucracy). We have secently proposed that competing expectations about public policy and public figures should affect the heterogeneity of individual response, not the mean Brehm 1995, 1997) .
From the point of view of the theory of the survey response, we do not expect respondents to have well-formed and stable opinions about all manner of potential policy questions. Instead, we might expect respondents to be able to offer a variety of potential answers (dubbed "considerations" by Zaller 1992 ). Our object of study is the variation in the set of potential opinions. Respondents with relatively low variation are likely to offer the same answer upon repeated interviews, while respondents with relatively wide variation might offer answers which vary considerably.
We conjecture that two separate factors influence the heterogeneity of individual response: the extent to which multiple predispositions (values, expectations, beliefs) pertain to the policy domain, and the respondents' informedness. When multiple predispositions are in conflict with one another, the more variable a respondent's answers are likely to be. When multiple predispositions are mutually reinforcing, the respondent's answers should be less variable. Information may reduce response variability: this is the usual Bayesian interpretation of the effect of information on a decision. Information may also widen response variability to the extent to which it makes the competition between predispositions more salient.
We distinguish between three conditions of heterogeneity in individual response: ambivalence, uncertainty, or equivocation. The distinction between the three states stems from the effect of multiple predispositions, and of information, upon the respondent's answers:
Ambivalence: Coincident predispositions induce wider response variability; information widens response variability. Uncertainty: Coincident predispositions do not affect response variability; information narrows response variability. Equivocation: Coincident predispositions induce narrower response variability; information narrows response variability. Our use of the term "equivocation" in this paper is somewhat different from the use of the term in our earlier analysis of attitudes towards abortion (Alvarez and Brehm 1995) . There, we referred to equivocation as when "respondents might be uncertain about the interviewer's reaction to his or her answer, and offer 'mushy' answers to questions (especially controversial ones) to avoid making an unfavorable impression on the interviewer. Under such circumstances, there need not be any internal conflict on the respondent's attitudes, only conflict in expectations about the interviewer." We believe that the use of the term in the present context shares the spirit of the original usage, is closer to standard dictionary definitions of the word, and is more precise. We do wish to note that there is an important line of similarity between uncertainty and equivocation, in that additional information reduces response variability under both conditions. The important distinction is that multiple predispositions do not affect response variability under uncertainty, but decrease response variability under equivocation.
SPEAKING IN TWO VOICES
Ambivalence results when respondents' expectations or values are irreconcilable, such as we have demonstrated results in the area of abortion policy for those respondents who believe in both a woman's right to bodily autonomy and that human life begins before birth (Alvarez and Brehm 1995) . Respondents should be ambivalent towards bureaucracy when they see that the goals of responsiveness and equity are incompatible. Uncertainty results when respondents' expectations are not irreconcilable and when additional information reduces response variability. We have demonstrated that attitudes towards racial policy are a question of uncertainty (rather than ambivalence) since respondents are not in a state of conflict between egalitarian and individualist values; further, their opinions become more focused with additional (chronic) political information (Alvarez and Brehm 1997) . The third condition, equivocation, means literally to speak with two voices. Equivocation results when those respondents who have high expectations on two or more domains are even more fixed in their opinions than those who hold high expectations on only one domain. Equivocal respondents want both expectations (e.g., want bureaucracies to be both flexible and equitable), but see no contradiction or trade-off between them.
Specific to this present research problem, while scholars of public administration are convincing in their arguments about how bureaucracies cannot achieve all expectations at the same time, it is an open question whether citizens also see these expectations as competing and irreconcilable. In fact, we demonstrate below that coincident expectations about responsiveness and honesty lead respondents to be equivocal in their attitudes about the performances of IRS employees. Thus, while many Americans hold high expectations for the IRS, they do not necessarily see these expectations as conflictual. Instead, they want the IRS to achieve both responsiveness and honesty simultaneously.
The instructiveness of this research goes both ways. The particular domain of attitudes toward bureaucracy should yield insights about public opinion not obtainable by the study of attitudes towards other questions. Unlike attitudes towards much of public policy, real experience means that attitudes could be governed more by interest than by symbol. We all have experience dealing with bureaucracies, on a nearly daily basis; our attitudes toward public policy problems such as racial integration or abortion could be present without experience, only a result of the potent symbolic content of these policy problems. Further, the particular area of the present paper is one where citizens have concrete incentives to acquire domain-specific information. The better informed a respondent is about changes in tax policy, the more that respondent should be able to minimize his or her own tax burden, and to minimize the risks of sanction for failure to appropriately complete tax returns. Hawthorne and Jackson (1987) demonstrate that material selfinterest affects opinions on tax policy, one of very few areas where scholars have been successful in demonstrating direct effects of material self-interest on opinions. If there is ever a research area where highly domain-specific information should matter more than chronic informedness, it is probably in attitudes towards taxation, and to those who enforce tax law.
No United States bureaucracy is more emblematic of the disjunction between actual performance and public opprobrium than the Internal Revenue Service. United States voluntary tax compliance rates exceed those of every other Western democracy (Long and Swingen 1991) . IRS employees process more tax returns than any tax officials in the world. But the IRS and its employees fare very poorly in comparison not just to other federal bureaucracies, but also to other financial institutions (Harris 1988) . We demonstrate that these potentially contradictory expectations matter in determining American attitudes about the performance of IRS employees, in particular expectations about responsiveness and honesty. We will also show that chronic information and coincident expectations determine attitude variability, though in unexpected ways. The phrases "chronic" and "domain-specific" informedness may strike some readers as unnecessarily awkward, especially when our measure for chronic informedness is years of education. The key reason to use the terms, as noted in Zaller (1992) , is that respondents are generally unable to make use of predispositions without political information to place context. This information may take two forms, that available across policy domains and times ("chronic") or information directly pertinent to a specific policy choice ("domain-specific").
A Model of Attitudes About the IRS
To understand the way expectations influence attitudes about the IRS, we use the approach established in our earlier research. The essence of the model is that attitudes are formed by values or expectations. But individuals have differing levels of variability in their attitudes (due to ambivalence or equivocation induced by competing expectations or uncertainty produced by a lack of information), and this ambivalence or uncertainty can be modeled as the variance of each attitude.
As in our earlier work, we use heteroskedastic discrete choice models to estimate the variability in beliefs about the IRS Brehm 1995, 1997) . Generally, the basic idea behind the techniques we use is to specify and estimate simultaneously two related equations, one for the probability of a choice, the other for the variance of the error residual. We refer to the first equation as the "Choice Model" and to the second equation as the "Variance Model." Note that the variance modeled by this approach is the individual respondent's variance in choice, not the variance across the sample. Our ap-425 SPEAKING IN TWO VOICES proach employs inferential statistics in order to model and estimate this variance in choice.
As we discussed earlier, there is some discussion in both the academic literature and the popular press about the role that ambivalence plays in attitudes about government bureaucracy, even for individual choice. What is missing is a direct examination of the form of the response variability (i.e., uncertainty, ambivalence, or equivocation). Using the 1987 Taxpayer Opinion Survey and our heteroskedastic choice techniques, we examine policy choice variability and evaluate whether it is ambivalence, uncertainty, or equivocation that characterizes variable opinions about government bureaucracies.
To estimate the parameters of the two components of the model we use full-information maximum likelihood heteroskedastic discrete choice models. In our earlier work we used models with dichotomous dependent variables. A thorough review of the mechanics of these models, in particular the heteroskedastic probit model, may be found in our first paper (Alvarez and Brehm 1995) , as well as in one prominent econometrics text (Greene 1993) . In our earlier work we focused on models which have the usual categorical choice likelihood function: N log ~( n~)y; log n; + (1 yi) log(1 -n,) [11 = -i=l Where i indexes individuals and ni is reparameterized as a function, F(), (usually a probit or logit function) of a set of explanatory variables (X):
As we mentioned earlier, we call this function [2] the choice model. The usual probit or logit assumes that the variance of the choice function is constant and can be standardized to 1.
The innovation in our work is to notice that choice is sometimes heterogeneous, that the underlying variance of this choice function is not constant. Borrowing from Harvey's "multiplicative heteroskedasticity" approach (1976), we reparameterize the variance of an individual's choice (var(ci)) as a function of an additional set of explanatory variables (Z):
(exponentiation is required in order to keep variance greater than zero). We refer to this second function [3] as the variance model, as we also mentioned above. This leads to a variation on the usual probit log-likelihood for the binary choice model:
We used this log-likelihood function in our previous two analyses of heterogeneity in public opinion Brehm 1995, 1997) .
In this paper, we extend this heterogeneous discrete choice model to ordered categorical dependent variables. Our dependent measures of attitudes towards the IRS have six ordered categories, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. In this situation, the easiest approach (using linear regression) is clearly incorrect since the linear regression model is based on the assumption that the difference between adjacent points is constant, e.g., that the difference between "strongly agree" (6) and "agree somewhat" (5) is the same as the difference between "strongly disagree" (1) and "disagree somewhat" (2). Additionally, other discrete choice techniques (e.g., multinomial logit) would not take into account the ordinal nature of our dependent variables.
We begin the derivation of our ordered heteroskedastic choice model by noting that:
Here yi is our categorical dependent variable, Xi represents the variables in the choice function, 13 are the choice function parameters, pj are the estimated "thresholds" between choice categories, and oiis the error variance. Usual practice is to assume oito be unity (see Aitchison and Silvey 1957; McKelvey and Zavoina 1975) ; however, we wish to relax this assumption and assume heteroskedasticity.
As in our work on binary choice models, we parameterize the variance for an individual's choice (var(ei)) as a function of a set of explanatory variables (Zi):
This allows us to write the choice probabilities using this notation:
We assume that the errors have a normal distribution, implying that we simply substitute the standard normal distribution (@) for F in the expressions for the choice probabilities just presented. We give the full likelihood function for our model in the Appendix of this paper. We have estimated this model using both the normal and the logistic distribution in GAUSS. Ordinal probit models with heteroskedasticity can easily be estimated in LIMDEP. Below we present our results obtained using LIMDEP. GAUSS and LIMDEP code to estimate our models, the data we use in this analysis, and brief documentation about our analysis can be obtained from the ICPSR replication archive.
Importantly, there is an implicit likelihood-ratio test for the presence of heterogeneity with the addition of the variables in the denominator to the likelihood. If the variables in the variance function in the denominator add no new information, then the log-likelihood for ordered heteroskedastic probit will not be appreciably different from the log-likelihood for the standard ordered probit which assumes homoskedasticity. The test is then where LHis the log-likelihood for the heteroskedastic ordered probit, and L, is the log-likelihood for the standard ordered probit. The LR is distributed as a x2with as many degrees of freedom as there are Z variables. In our empirical analysis we present the results of these tests for heteroskedasticity.
Data and Measures
Our model requires that we have data for attitudes about the IRS, people's expectations about IRS activities, and their informedness about the IRS. The Internal Revenue Service commissioned the Harris Associates survey organization to conduct a nationwide survey of taxpayers in July and August of 1987, in the first year that the Tax Reform Act went into effect, referred to as the "1987 Taxpayer Opinion Survey" (TOS). The purposes of the study were varied, including general questions on tax reform, views about tax evasion, and experiences with and attitudes toward the IRS. Our interest in the present paper is to explore the latter topic, and the survey instrument contains several truly unique features. The survey data are available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR # 8927) as a Class IV release. This means that much of the details of the study information must be obtained through government documents, or through the Harris organization. As best we can tell at this time, the survey was administered as a face-to-face interview to 2,003 respondents, with a slightly unusual sample selection procedure. The study began with selection of 200 primary sampling units, and then drew a sample frame representative of the entire adult population of the United States. Because not every adult resident of the United States is required to submit an IRS return, the survey administrators further selected the respondents who represent the "taxpayers sample." Interviewers determined this on the basis of all household members who filed a Federal return, or where the spouse filed a joint return with the respondent. The method cannot identify respondents who should have filed under IRS regulations, but did not.
We use one set of these questions to develop eight measures of attitudes towards the IRS from the 1987 TOS as dependent variables in our analysis. The survey asked respondents to state whether they agreed or disagreed (on a 6 point scale, where 6 represented "strongly agree" and 1 represented "strongly disagree") with the following statements:
Honesty: "The IRS employees are honest-you could never bribe them." Knowledgeable: "IRS employees are just as knowledgeable as any private tax expert." Equitable: "I am confident that the IRS would never try to take more money from me than they should." Accurate: "You can depend on the IRS to keep accurate tax records." Snooping: "That the IRS automatically withholds some of my income and even gets copies of my W2 forms and interest statements sometimes makes me feel they are always nearby and watching." Own: "When it comes to investigating their own people, the IRS is as thorough as they are with everyone else." Integrity: "IRS employees have an unusual amount of honesty and integrity." Reasonable: "IRS procedures and practices are fair and reasonable ones that respect the rights of taxpayers."
Those eight statements give us the eight dependent variables we use below (we refer to each by the name given to the variable on the left).
Figure 1 displays histograms of each of the eight scales. Somewhat surprisingly, the IRS employees fare reasonably well on most of these scales. Respondents were more inclined to agree than disagree that IRS employees are honest, knowledgeable, and provide accurate information, and the differences are pronounced. The advantages of IRS employees are slightly less pronounced when it comes to being seen as reasonable, and likely to investigate violations of their own. The one dimension in which the IRS comes out poorly concerns the sole negative question, where respondents are slightly more likely to agree than disagree that they feel the IRS is always watching. Our enterprise in this paper will be to account for variation on each of these eight scales by how strongly the respondent feels Integrity Reasonable the IRS meets each of three potentially competing expectations: honesty, responsiveness, and fairness. Next, we use a measurement model approach to develop scales for expectations of honesty, responsiveness, and fairness. Specifically, we apply a confirmatory factor model (estimated with CALIS under SAS) which constrains each indicator to load on one latent variable alone, frees the covariances among the latent variables, and fixes the unique errors to have zero covariances. Table 1 details the confirmatory factor results (Goodness of Fit Index of 34).
First, our measure for fairness comes from seven questions in the 1987 TOS which all measure the fairness of the federal income tax system, or of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. We wish to be blunt about the limits of the measure for "fairness." This measure of fairness concerns the fairness of the tax system, not of the members of the IRS (unlike the next two measures for honesty and responsiveness). The potential logical contradiction falls between the fairness of the IRS and the responsiveness of IRS officials: one cannot have a system that is flexible with respect to the problems that individual citizens might have with the tax code, and still treat each individual in an identical, equitable way. The fairness of the IRS officials is closer to the idea of "procedural fairness" explicated by Scholz and Pinney (1995) and Tyler (1990) , and is indeed closer to the original formulation of the contradiction by Wilson (1967 Nonetheless, the measure of the fairness of the tax system is a useful proxy for the procedural fairness of the IRS officials. Contemporary political rhetoric routinely confounds attitudes towards taxation with attitudes towards the IRS. In the recent debates over tax simplification, advocates of the "flat tax" such as Senator Robert Dole or candidate Steve Forbes claimed that it would eliminate the IRS as Americans currently know it. Since much of the attitudes of citizens towards IRS officials is symbolic (i.e., not grounded in actual contact with IRS officials, but grounded in the submission of IRS returns), we think it is a reasonable proxy for procedural fairness to use citizens' attitudes towards the tax system. We should still temper our conclusions with regard to the equivocal attitudes Americans hold towards the IRS in the potential conflict between fairness and responsiveness, since we do not have the direct measurement of responsiveness.
The second measure is for honesty of the IRS staff, and it is constructed from responses to two questions, both focused on the honesty of the IRS staff as compared to other public and private employees. There are two indicators which compare assessments of the honesty of IRS employees relative to other federal government agencies and to other financial institutions. The loading for the freed factor is quite high, suggesting a coherence of the two indicators. "Honesty" is the one dimension that respondents rated IRS employees above other agencies and other financial institutions.
Last, we measure the responsiveness of the IRS with four questions. These four questions focus on the willingness of IRS staff to assist taxpayers and on the helpfulness of the IRS staff relative to other public and private employees. (An alternative interpretation of this scale [and these indicators] would be "flexibility" or simply "helpfulness".)
After construction of the scales, we rescale each of the three to 0-1 bounds, where 0 is the observed minimum for each scale, and 1 is the observed maximum. Thus, a maximum on any of our scales only refers to the maximum observed among the TOS employees, not to a logical extreme score on all measures. What a high score means is that the respondent finds the IRS to be quite honest, flexible, or fair. We do not have any measures of whether respondents find honesty, responsiveness, or fairness to be desirable; it is logically possible that a respondent could consider, for example, IRS officials to be quite honest, and that honesty is not a particularly valued feature. (It is even conceivable that some respondents might consider IRS officials to be honest, and this honesty to be a problem!) But we do wish to argue that these three scales measure respondents' "expectations" about the IRS: given an arbitrary future encounter with the IRS, respondents who score high on these scales would be "expecting" that the IRS officials are honest, fair, or flexible.
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Additionally, in our "Choice models" we also employ four control variables. Two of these control variables measure respondent contact with the IRS: respondent-initiated contact and IRS audits of the respondent's previous tax returns. We also use dummy variables to control for racial and gender differences in attitudes about the IRS.
Third, we need a measure of how informed each respondent is about tax policy. One of the most intriguing features of the 1987 TOS is the extent to which the interviewer attempted to assess the respondent's informedness about the changes in the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA). The TRA represented the culmination of years of activity from members of both parties (both Ronald Reagan and Bill Bradley were among the early partisans). Changes made during the mark-up sessions were complicated and many. In a battery of questions appearing very early within the instrument, respondents were asked to identify whether each of 22 aspects of the tax law had changed under the TRA, and if so, in what way. Table 2 displays the list of potentially changing aspects of the code, and the "correct" answers associated with each. We determined the "correct" answer in each case by consultation with one of two IRS documents, the Summary for Individuals or the Highlights of the 1987 Tax Reform Act.
We used these 22 questions to create a domain-specific information scale, which we call the "soft" information measure. The soft information scale simply records whether the respondent was aware that the particular aspect had changed, in some way. Thus, our domain-specific information measure really is designed to assess the degree to which a respondent crossed the lowest threshold of informedness about the TRA (whether the 22 aspects of the tax code changed or not). We also used the second set of responses to these questions-which measured whether or not the respondent knew anything about the actual change in each dimension of tax policy-to develop a second domain-specific information measure, which we called the "hard information scale. We replicated our models using the "hard" information scale in the place of the "soft" scale, and there was little appreciable difference in the estimated results. These results are available from the authors.
As the reader will note from Table 2 , 20 out of the 22 items changed in one direction or another. A naive respondent who simply assumed that everything changed would have been correct on 92% of these questions. Table  2 also notes the percentage of TOS respondents who correctly ascertained whether the aspect had changed. Nearly half of the respondents knew that the dollar amount of the exemption had changed; the percent of respondents who knew about the changes to other aspects of the code were substantially under this percentage. Even familiarity with whether an aspect changed (the "soft" information scale) proved to be a strong test of informedness about the code. In Figure 2 , we present a histogram of the distribution of the soft information scale. One truly striking feature is that the vast majority of respondents scored extremely low on this scale, even when a guess that everything changed would have yielded an extremely high score. In fact, only 2% of the respondents exceeded this score. We also wish to note that this scale generates respondents who scored at both extremes, from those who answered This measure of domain-specific informedness is, in our view, truly unusual for attitudes toward public policy concerns. Consider Zaller's (1992, 43) book which explores the respondent's levels of political informedness, in this case, constructed as a measure of "general, chronic awareness." Zaller writes In using this sort of measure, I will be assuming that persons who are knowledgeable about politics in general are habitually attentive to communications on most particular issues as well.
This measurement strategy is less than ideal. More narrowly focused measures of awareness-devoted exclusively, say, to intellectual engagement with foreign policy issues or race policy issues, and used exclusively in connection with reception of information concerning foreign or race policy issues-would be preferable to general awareness 435 SPEAKING IN TWO VOICES measures. However, such domain-specific awareness measures are rarely carried on opinion surveys and none are available for the cases I examine in this study (1992, 43) .
Likewise, Luskin (1987) constructs a measure of general political informedness by tallying respondents' correct relative placement of the parties on a battery of 11 issues. Although the measure is composed of domain-specific information, Luskin explicitly aims for a more comprehensive notion of "information holding," presumably because (as argued earlier in the essay) "Ideology as high sophistication is comprehensive (1987, 863) "
Despite the regular dependence of many scholars upon "chronic" informedness as the means to assess how respondents incorporate messages about politics, it is possible that highly domain specific information could matter more than chronic informedness. If the models maintain that respondents' ability to counter-argue against counter-partisan information (to "resist" in Zaller's model) hinges upon the store of information that the respondent possesses, it makes considerably greater sense that the respondents' arguments are grounded in the specific domain of the communication, and not simply their "chronic" connection to elite discourse. But this is a testable question, and we do want to allow for the possibility that chronic information "matters," so we use the respondent's education level as a measure of chronic informedness or political sophistication in our model. This will allow us to examine whether domain-specific information indeed outweighs chronic informedness in our models, or whether neither matters.
Last, we need measures of coincident (and thus potentially contradictory) expectations. We operationalize three different measures of coincident expectations, one for each pair of expectations (fairness and responsiveness, fairness and honesty, and responsiveness and honesty). For each pair of expectations (El and EZ) we operationalize coincident expectations as:
where each Ej is a particular measure of individual expectations. The intuition behind this operationalization of coincident expectations is simple: individuals who have the greatest potential for competing expectations are those who hold both expectations at the same level of esteem, while those who expect only one dimension have the least potential for coincident expectations. Assume that we have two expectations, both of which are measured from 0 to 1, with low scores indicating little belief in the particular expectation and high scores a great deal of belief in the expectation. Thus, people who have the potential for total contradiction are those who believe strongly in both expectations. Our operationalization would score these individuals as having totally coincident expectations, or 1. Alternatively, individuals have expectations which are not competing when they place strong weight on only one expectation; in that case, they are scored 0.
This operationalization produces a clear prediction for how these measures should perform in our variance model if they are in fact contradictory. Individuals who have competing expectations (and hence ambivalent), should have greater attitude variability-or greater error variance. Those who do not have competing expectations, on the other hand, should not be ambivalent and should have lower error variance. Thus, if these expectations compete for respondents (and not just seen as contradictory by public administration scholars), we should estimate positively-signed coefficients for each of the three simultaneous expectation measures which we include in our models. If, on the other hand, respondents are equivocal, then we anticipate the opposite effect: the coefficients on the competing expectations measures should be negative.
Note, however, that the present measure of coincident expectations differs in a significant way from the measure we used in our paper on attitudes towards abortion (Alvarez and Brehm 1995) and in a minor way from the measure we used in our paper on attitudes towards racial policy (Alvarez and Brehm 1997 ). In the abortion paper, we used the product of the number of positive and negative reasons a respondent could elaborate on whether abortion should be legal. That measure was particularly well-suited to the problem, since it could capture "intensity" of coincidence of predispositions. Unfortunately, we do not have an equivalent elaboration measure in the present data collection. For both the elaboration measure we used in our earlier work and the present absolute difference measure, the central idea is the same: those who score equivalently on both predispositions are the individuals for whom the potential of ambivalence or equivocation is greatest. We explicitly argue that one cannot claim that the individual with multiple predispostions pertaining to a policy problem is in a state of conflict unless the presence of those multiple predispositions leads to wider response variability.
Secondly, the present measure differs from the measure in the racial policy paper in that we subtract the absolute value of the difference in predispositions from 1 here, and did not subtract it from 1 in the racial policy paper. Subtracting the difference from 1 aids in interpretation in that positive coefficients here mean increasing variance (whereas it was the reverse in the racial policy paper). This operation is functionally equivalent to a simple reversal of signs of the coefficients.
Therefore, the two components of our model each are specified:
Choice Model : = F(P, + P, Responsiveness We expect that the first three coefficients (j', throughJ3) in the choice model should be positive, which means that to the extent the individual expects the IRS will achieve a characteristic more than other individuals, she will be more likely to rate the performance of IRS employees positively. The effects of contacts with the IRS (expressed byJ, andJ,) should be negative, while the other two control variables should have positive effects on beliefs about the IRS (whites and males should have more positive assessments of the IRS than nonwhites and females). In the variance model, though, we expect that both the coefficients on education and information to be negative. This means that the higher the individual's information about the 1987 TRA, or the greater their level of educational attainment, the lower the variance in their beliefs. If respondents are ambivalent we expect the signs on y3, y4 and y, will be positive; yet if respondents are equivocal, then we expect that the same coefficients will be negative. We now test these hypotheses in the next section. Tables 3A and 3B First, the eight models we estimated all fit the sample data reasonably well. The percentages of cases correctly predicted range from just over 30% to just over 50%, which demonstrates that we are classifying cases relatively accurately with our model. We also provide a second summary statistic, the "percentage reduction in error" (PRE) which gives the percentage increase in predictive power relative to a null model (only constants). These range from a low of about 6% (the "Snooping" and "Integrity" models) to a high of 27% ("Accurate" model). Again, these fit statistics show that our heteroskedastic ordinal probit model fits the sample data relatively well.
Results
Choice Model
Beginning with the estimated results for the choice component of the model, note that in general the three expectation measures perform as 438 Tables 3A and 3B demonstrate that more positive expectations lead to more positive evaluations of the IRS. These results seem to indicate, however, that two expectations-responsiveness and honesty-have the greatest effect in determining beliefs about the IRS. The coefficients for responsiveness and honesty are correctly signed in all instances but one; six responsiveness coefficients are also statistically significant, while six of eight honesty coefficients are significant. Clearly, responsiveness and honesty are the dominant expectations in the choice model.
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The estimated results also show that expectations about fairness have little influence on attitudes towards the IRS. Only three of eight estimated coefficients for fairness are statistically significant in the choice model, and two of the insignificant coefficients are even incorrectly signed. This shows that expectations about fairness are not as strong a determinant of attitudes towards the IRS as are expectations about responsiveness and honesty. (The reader should recall that the measure of fairness is of the fairness of the tax system, not a measure of the fairness of IRS employees per se.) However, we temper these conclusions about the choice model since ordered probit models need care to interpret. First, as is usually the case in discrete choice models, the coefficient estimates obtained are not directly related to the marginal effects of each independent variable on the choice probabilities. This means that additional steps are useful to make these results easily interpretable. Second, the ordered nature of our dependent variables can yield a further complication. Say we are interested in the marginal effect of an increase in one of the independent variables on the predicted probabilities of choosing each category. An increase in the independent variable in question implies a decrease in the probability of the lowest category being chosen, and an increase in the probability of the highest category being chosen. But for the middle categories, the results can often be ambiguous, since an increase in the value of an independent variable can lead to a decrease or an increase in the probabilities of middle categories being chosen.
So that we can better interpret these results, we transform the results presented in Tables 3A and 3B into estimated marginal effects of changes in the right-hand side variables on changes in the predicted probabilities of choice. The two choices we consider are the probabilities of choosing "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree," each of which defines the endpoints of our dependent variables. Additional details of how these probability estimates were obtained are in the Appendix.
In Tables 4A and 4B we give the estimated marginal effects of each right-hand side variable on the probability of choosing "strongly disagree" first, followed by the probability of "strongly agree." The correct signs for these probability estimates are that those for the probability of a "strongly disagree" response should be negative (increasingly positive expectations should lead to a lower probability of a "strongly disagree" response), while those for the probability of a "strongly agree" response should be positive (increasingly positive expectations should lead to a higher probability of a "strongly agree" response).
In general, we see the expected patterns in Tables 4A and 4B . For six of the eight dependent variables, we see correctly signed marginal effects (accurate, equitable, honest, integrity, check own and reasonable). We also see a striking difference in how strong the estimated effects of each expectation are. Clearly, the effects of responsiveness are the greatest in the choice model. Second are the effects of honesty, while the effects of fairness are virtually non-existent in the choice model.
Variance Model
Competing expectations may also influence the variance of attitudes, and not just the mean. Turning now to the bottom panels of Tables 3A and  3B , it is clear that significant heterogeneity exists in the responses to these questions about the IRS. All of the eight heteroskedasticity tests produce x2 statistics which are greater than the critical threshold of 11.07. This means that we can reject the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity with confidence in every one of these models.
We use the estimated results from the variance model to examine three different hypotheses. First, we want to determine if information (or the lack of information, uncertainty) influences the heterogeneity which individuals have in their responses to these questions about the IRS. In addition, we partition information into domain-specific information (the "soft" information scale) and into chronic information (the respondent's level of educational attainment).
The variance model results produce mixed results for the argument that uncertainty produces variability in these survey responses. On one hand, we can reject the hypothesis that domain-specific information produces response variability: only one of the "soft" information estimates is statistically significant and it is positively signed (the only coefficient of the eight models which is consistent with our operationalization of ambivalence). But on the other hand, there is some evidence that chronic information matters Marginal effects for coeffiecients in the choice model are the estimated effects of each variable on the probability of choosing the low category followed by the probability of choosing the high category. Marginal effects for coefficients in the variance model are the estimated effects of each variable on the magnitude of the estimated error variance.
here, since all eight of the coefficients on education in the variance model are correctly signed (negative) and since five of these coefticients reach statistical significance. Thus, on the basis of these results, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that domain-specific informedness does not produce individual variability in attitudes about the IRS; we are able to reject the null hypothesis that greater chronic information produces greater variability in respondent attitudes about the IRS. The third hypothesis we wish to examine with our variance model concerns whether simultaneous expectations induce ambivalence (and generate higher attitude variability for respondents), or whether they induce equivocation (and generate lower attitude variability for respondents). The results in Tables 3A and 3B provide insight into this question, since we see strong evidence in support of the argument that coincident expectations for responsiveness and honesty leads not to greater attitude variability for respondents, 
Note:
Marginal effects for coefficients in the choice model are the estimated effects of each variable on the probability of choosing the low category followed by the probability of choosing the high category. Marginal effects for coefficients in the variance model are the estimated effects of each variable on the magnitude of the estimated error variance.
but for significantly lower variability. Seven of the eight coefficients for this simultaneous expectations term are statistically significant and negatively signed. However, the results for the other two expectation competition terms do not demonstrate consistent effects, which implies that we can confidently say that the coincident expectation of responsiveness and honesty is the most influential of the joint expectation terms in the variance model. Interpreting the estimated effects of each variable in the variance function is also not straightforward. To facilitate interpretation, we resort to a procedure different than that used for the choice function (details are presented in the Appendix). In Tables 4A and 4B we give the marginal effects of each component of the variance function of the estimated magnitude of the error variance.
First, for the two information variables ("soft" information and education) we can see the inconsistent effects of domain-specific information on error variance, but the consistent and sizeable effects of chronic information. Again, the effect of chronic information (education) in the variance models is always negative, meaning that higher education yields lower error variance; often times this effect seems quite strong as well.
Next, the coincident expectation terms show clearly that the competition between responsiveness and honesty has the most potent effect in the variance models. All of the estimated effects are negatively signed. While the fairness-responsiveness expectation competition term is negatively signed in five of eight models, in general the estimated effect of this expectational competition is less than that for responsiveness-honesty. Last, notice that the estimated effect for the fairness-honesty competition is negatively signed in only four instances, and is not very strong.
Interpretation of this central result requires some care. Although Wilson (1967) and others are quite persuasive in their arguments that bureaucracies cannot achieve high levels of responsiveness, equity, and honesty at the same time, the evidence here is that most respondents fail to see the contradiction. If respondents were aware of the difficulties that bureaucracies have in being both flexible and honest, for example, we would have seen positive signs on the simultaneous expectations; the results are overwhelmingly the reverse. In fact, the results demonstrate that the more respondents expect both responsiveness and honesty, the less variable and more certain they are in their opinions. In other words, with respect to responsiveness and honesty-the two expectations which most strongly shape attitudes towards the IRS-our evidence demonstrates that respondents are equivocal, not ambivalent nor uncertain.
In addition, the results from the variance model demonstrate that chronic, and not domain-specific, information has a strong effect on individual belief variance. But, the effects of chronic information in Tables 4A  and 4B are generally lesser than those for the responsiveness-honesty interaction. This indicates that individual variation in their beliefs about the IRS stems not as much from a lack of chronic information as it does from the kinds of expectations people have about bureaucracies.
Conclusions
Recent political discourse, especially in the wake of insurgent, antiWashington and anti-government candidates like Buchanan and Perot, seems to show an increasing level of ambivalence towards the institutions of government. Some branches of the federal government, like the FBI and the IRS, have drawn particular scorn from many elements in American society. Although Wilson's (1967) article on the varied and competing expectations Americans have about bureaucratic performance is widely reprinted and cited, our research here is the first attempt to employ public opinion data to test the presence of coincident expectations. In this paper we have begun the first systematic effort to assess whether Americans are indeed There are three specific conclusions to draw from our results in this paper. First, responsiveness and honesty are the expectations which tend to dominate beliefs about the IRS, not fairness. We found that across the eight different dimensions of beliefs about the IRS, in general, responsiveness and honesty had the strongest effect in determining individual attitudes about the IRS. This indicates that the current proposals to reform both the operations of the IRS and the current tax code are not going to be easy and quick sells to the American public. On the one hand, the beliefs of Americans about the IRS are strongly related to the notion of responsiveness-as responsiveness increases in importance, so does positive evaluations of the IRS-which implies that if any proposal is to be successful, it must preserve or enhance the responsiveness in the current system. But on the other hand, Americans also structure their attitudes about the IRS with beliefs about honesty; reforms must produce a system which is perceived as upholding this belief as well. Surprisingly, fairness is not as strong a determinant of beliefs about the IRS, although the measure of fairness is not a measure of procedural fairness, but of the fairness of the tax system. Nonetheless, changes in the tax code do not have to necessarily lead to a perception of fairness.
Second, domain-specific information does not play a strong role in determining individual variability in beliefs. In this respect, the findings here are dissimilar to our earlier findings in the case of beliefs about racial policy. There we showed that individual variability in beliefs is largely determined by information (or the lack of information) and not by conflicting core beliefs. Thus, in contrast to the case of opinions about affirmative action, we feel that the beliefs of Americans about their governmental institutions are not strongly influenced by the information they obtain about those institutions. In this sense, uncertainty in beliefs about the IRS are not strongly influenced by elite discourse about the IRS specifically, nor the government in general.
Third, both coincident expectations and chronic informedness influence the fundamental variability of Americans' attitudes about the IRS.
In the results presented here we have portrayed Americans as having complicated beliefs about the IRS. In our earlier work, we found that competing predispositions influenced heterogeneity in beliefs about abortion policy, but not for beliefs about affirmative action. We also found that information bore much more heavily in beliefs about affirmative action than abortion.
We believe that our findings on the origins of attitudes toward bureaucracy, in this case the IRS, are unique. Our results suggest that although contradictions presumptively exist across these expectations, public attitudes towards the IRS hinge primarily on only two of the three potential expecta-tions: responsiveness and honesty take preeminence. Fairness, as measured here, matters hardly at all, although note that the idea of fairness measured here emphasizes fairness of outcomes, as opposed to procedural fairness. There is good evidence that procedural fairness matters in attitudes towards taxation and tax compliance (Scholz and Pinney 1995) , and in support for criminal justice (Tyler 19901 , and one may wish to reserve judgment about its potential effects upon attitudes towards the agencies and bureaucrats who administer such programs.
While both responsiveness and honesty were influential in our models, responsiveness dominates for most of the eight dependent measures. This implies that what affects whether a typical citizen expresses support for bureaucracy is his or her perception that the bureaucracy is responsive and flexible. Wilson (1967) presages the potential for political problems when responsiveness is the sole goal:
Responsiveness is never easy or wholly desirable; if every person were treated in accordance with his special needs, there would be no program at all. (The only system that meets the responsiveness problem squarely is the free market.) But at least with clear objectives we would know what we are giving up in those cases when responsiveness seems necessary, and thus we would be able to decide how much we are willing to tolerate (1967, 8) .
In the case of attitudes about the IRS, both chronic information and expectation competition are important determinants of heterogeneous beliefs, but in surprising ways. We have strong evidence that expectations about bureaucracy are not "contradictory" in the sense that holding high expectations on competing dimensions leads to greater response variance, and in fact, exactly the opposite occurs. It may be true that bureaucracies cannot be both fully flexible, fully honest, and fully equitable at the same time, but respondents do not share the worries of public administration scholars. Our results put Wilson's arguments in a sharper irony: if it is true that these competing expectations hinder bureaucracies' ability to achieve high public standards and meet approval, most respondents are unaware of the fact, and more likely to be certain of their (presumably low) opinions.
But in only one instance did we find that the effects of chronic information were greater than expectation conflict. In general, we have shown that the effects of chronic information, while present and important, have lesser effects on the variability of attitudes about the IRS than coincident expectations.
Thus, the causes of heterogeneous beliefs in the case of the IRS comprise a very different case from the two cases we have examined in our past 447 SPEAKING IN TWO VOICES work. Information matters, particularly of the chronic form, which looks more like the condition we labeled as "uncertain" opinions about racial policy. Competing expectations matter, too, but in such a way that they reduce rather than augment variation in opinion, unlike both the racial policy and abortion policy cases. This is a state that we call "equivocation": holding simultaneous expectations which do not contradict (to the respondent), while also becoming less variable in opinion with acquisition of greater information.
This means that, like the debate over abortion, the political debate about the IRS (and possibly the federal bureaucracy) will be quite sensitive to how the debate is framed-in other words, the equivocation of Americans about the IRS will be influenced by the way in which politicians and elites frame their debate about this federal institution. Framing the debate to be about responsiveness or honesty, or about both simultaneously, will impact how the American public thinks about the IRS. President Clinton's simultaneous repudiation of big government while lauding government employees appears to be well in keeping with respondents' attitudes towards the IRS.
From here, our research agenda must proceed in two directions. First, the next step in our research agenda is to step back and to begin to understand the processes which help shape public opinion from the macro-level. What this paper and its predecessors offers is a method for adjudicating between the three different forms of response variability. The larger question is when should the analyst expect each of these forms and why. Full treatment of this question is beyond the scope of the present analysis, but speculation is possible. We see two distinct routes by which respondents would be ambivalent, uncertain, or equivocal: one which proceeds from logical relationships among predispositions, a second which proceeds from the framing of elite debates to citizens' understandings of the problem. Under some circumstances, it is entirely possible that predispositions are logically incompatible: it is logically incompatible to protect life before birth and to allow a woman full autonomy over her decision to bear the fetus. By this first route, respondents become ambivalent because they are seeking to reconcile incompatible predispositions. But the present study illustrates that what the analyst might consider to be a logical incompatibility, or at least a tension, between responsiveness, honesty, and fairness does not exist in mass attitudes towards the IRS.
The more plausible route to ambivalence, uncertainty, and equivocation is the second: elites frame policy choices as choices between values, beliefs, or expectations. There is growing evidence of the prominence of elite frames as setting the way in which citizens understand policy questions (e.g., Kinder and Sanders 1996) . If competing elites are equally successful in propagating irreconcilable values across the public (such that many members of the public express support for both), we would expect ambivalence to be the norm. If competing elites convince separate groups of the applicability of key values, then uncertainty is more likely. If elites advocate multiple values, and the conflict between these values is never salient (or logically present), we would expect equivocation. The two routes need not be mutually exclusive: elites might exploit the irreconcilability of widely shared mass values, leading to an interplay between mass predispositions and elite framing.
The second step to the present research agenda is extension of the specific target of public evaluation. Our present work focuses only on this one specific branch of the federal government, so it is difficult to generalize to the federal bureaucracy as a whole. We believe, however, that this same model can (and should) be extended to other branches of the federal bureaucracy, and that this exercise might show that much of the current disfavor held by the American public towards their federal government arises from their unmeetable, competing expectations.
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APPENDIX
The likelihood function for our ordered heteroskedastic probit model is relatively easy to derive. We begin by assuming that there is a continuous underlying process Y, such that: Next we denote our "threshold" parameters by p j , where j = 1, . . . , m and p, = --and pm = =.We constrain the thresholds so that the probabilities are always positive:
SPEAKING IN TWO VOICES
We know from the data which category yi belongs to, so we can write that yi belongs to category j if the following expression holds:
To make the exposition easier, we assume that y, is a series of j binary variables (instead of being coded as one ordinal variable) such that:
We next write the probability that yi is in j as:
Usual derivations of this likelihood at this point assume that oi = 1. As we argue in the text, we wish to assume that choice is heterogeneous, so we assume instead that oi = exp(y'zi) [211 where Ziare variables which we believe measure the heterogeneity in choices across individuals and y are coefficients.
We now write the likelihood for a given set of parameters as:
We take logs to produce the log-likelihood function:
where we assume that F represents the standard cumulative normal distribution. The first derivatives of the model are easy to present (Greene 1997) . Using the same notation, except referencing one of the ordinal categories as k from the set j and noting thatf gives the normal density 4 , we obtain the following derivative. This log-likelihood and these derivatives are easy to program in GAUSS, using both the normal and logistic distributions. The second derivatives are not necessary, since scoring method algorithms like the BHHH are available to estimate the covariance matrix by using the cross-product of the matrix of first derivatives. This model is also easy to implement in LIMDEP, and the results we present in the paper were produced using LIMDEP. Computer code, in both GAUSS and LIMDEP, and the data we used to estimate our models is available from the ICPSR replication archive.
We experienced no unusual problems estimating this model in either GAUSS or LIMDEP. Using LIMDEP, all of our heteroskedastic ordinal probit models reached convergence in 30 to 35 iterations. The primary problem with estimation of any ordinal choice model (with or without heteroskedasticity) is that the estimated thresholds must be strictly ordered; sometimes in the course of maximum-likelihood estimation values for some of the thresholds might be encountered which violate this strict ordering. In these cases, estimation of the model might become problematic. However, we have not encountered this problem in our application of the heteroskedastic ordinal probit model.
Estimation of the marginal effects of each right-hand side variable on the probabilities of various choices being made are easy to compute. In general, we write these marginal effects as:
Since we present the marginal of each right-hand side variable on the probabilities of choosing the low (L) and high (H) The marginal effects of each variable in the variance model are calculated differently. Instead of determining the marginal effects of each variable on the probabilities of choice, we estimated the marginal effect of each variable on the magnitude of the error variance. We hold all of the variables in the variance function constant at their sample mean values but one. We then estimate the magnitude of the error variance for the particular variable at the sample minimum value and then at the sample maximum value, and present the difference between these two numbers in Tables 4A and 4B. 
